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Focus: Criminal Jurisdiction
Guyora Binder*

AUTHORITY TO PROSCRIBE AND PUNISH
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES†

Although criminal jurisdiction is usually exercised by governments, offences can
also be proscribed by international law, and punishment can be imposed by international tribunals. This article critically examines the legitimacy of such exercises of
international criminal jurisdiction. It reasons that criminal law can plausibly be
justiﬁed as a cooperative institution that achieves the public good of a rule of law,
with its attendant beneﬁts of social peace and equal dignity of persons. It then argues that such a beneﬁcial rule of law requires a punishing authority with the executive capacity to protect those it claims to regulate. It would follow that criminal
prohibitions may not be justiﬁable if they cannot be enforced systematically. Because
the international legal system generally lacks the executive capacity required for a
rule of law, the article suggests that international criminal punishment is justiﬁable
as supportive of a rule of law only in rare circumstances. Finally, the article considers whether an alternative expressive rationale can, nevertheless, justify occasional
prosecutions as useful in legitimizing international humanitarian norms. It questions whether the expressive beneﬁts of such prosecutions can outweigh the expressive
risks of promising protection the international legal system cannot deliver.
Keywords: criminal law, international law, International Criminal Court,
jurisdiction, punishment theory

I

Introduction

Jurisdiction comprises the powers to legislate, to adjudicate, and to execute law. Criminal jurisdiction includes the legislative power to proscribe
conduct and the adjudicative power to impose punishment for it.
Thus far, criminal jurisdiction has received more attention from international law scholars than from criminal law scholars. International lawyers see jurisdiction, generally, and criminal jurisdiction, in particular, as
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essential attributes of state sovereignty. Thus, the criminal jurisdiction of a
sovereign state is presumptively legitimate and raises a problem of international law only when it conﬂicts with the sovereignty of another state.
By contrast with international law scholarship, criminal law scholarship questions the legitimacy of criminal jurisdiction itself. Criminal law
theorists Antony Duff and George Fletcher have each argued that the
justice of punishment depends not only on the accused’s desert, but also
on the authority of some institution to impose punishment for the
offence charged.1 Or, as Alejandro Chehtman puts it, ‘[T]he question
about the justiﬁcation for legal punishment is not only about whether it
is permissible to punish an offender . . ., but rather, and crucially, about
whether some particular body . . . has the right to do so.’2 Criminal punishment is, after all, an exercise of coercive power. In a liberal society,
such a use of force must be justiﬁed as legitimate.
Although criminal jurisdiction is usually exercised by national and subnational governments, offences can also be proscribed and punished by
international law. Thus, international law has long deﬁned such offences
as piracy, slave trading, and war crimes, and more recently has added
crimes against humanity and genocide.3 The power of states to collectively proscribe international crimes was asserted after World War II
when the victorious allies established an ad hoc tribunal to try Nazi leaders not only for war crimes but also for the novel offences of crimes
against humanity and aggression. It was reafﬁrmed by the creation of ad
hoc international tribunals for the conﬂicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
The Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court also proscribes international crimes. This treaty confers jurisdiction on the International Criminal Court to punish war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide committed (1) on the territory or by a national of any signatory or (2) in a conﬂict the UN Security Council has asked the Court
to investigate.4 The criminal law applied by the Court is deﬁned by the
1 Antony Duff, ‘Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law’ in Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, eds, The Philosophy of International Law (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010) 589 at 591–2; George Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal
Law: Foundations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 152–5, 247–52.
2 Alejandro Chehtman, ‘Citizenship v Territory: Explaining the Scope of the Criminal
Law’ (2010) 13 New Criminal Law Review 427 at 428.
3 Ronald C Slye & Beth Van Schaack, International Criminal Law: Essentials (New York:
Aspen, 2008) at 6–45. A sceptic might argue that customary international law did not
proscribe these offences, but only permitted the state to proscribe them extraterritorially.
4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, arts 5, 12,
13 (entered into force 1 July 2002) [Rome Statute]. The court is required to defer to
national courts willing and able to prosecute such crimes occurring on their territory
or by their nationals; ibid, 17. Signatories may also invite the court to judge crimes
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Rome Statute rather than by national codes.5 Signatories consent to the
Court’s application of such law, and some states automatically incorporate treaties into their own law. Yet the collective deﬁnition of crimes by
treaty is arguably an international exercise of legislative jurisdiction to
proscribe. And certainly, that is true in so far as that law is applied to
non-signatories in cases referred by the Security Council.
Most international lawyers also hold that customary international law
permits states – and presumably the international tribunals they establish
– ‘universal’ adjudicative jurisdiction to punish serious international
crimes occurring anywhere.6 Thus, one possible implication of characterizing an offence as an international crime is this expansion of adjudicative criminal jurisdiction. Indeed, in one of the few books in English
on criminal jurisdiction, Chehtman analyses international criminal liability as a form of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.7 In addition to supporting universal jurisdiction to punish international crimes, some
international lawyers also hold that states and international organizations have a right of military intervention to prevent such crimes.8 This
right of humanitarian intervention can be thought of as a kind of universal executive jurisdiction to enforce international criminal law.
Because universal jurisdiction and humanitarian intervention are both
primarily directed against misconduct by government ofﬁcials, they challenge national sovereignty. Thus, Andrew Altman and Christopher Wellman argue that states permitting systematic human rights abuses should
forfeit the protections of sovereignty.9 Indeed, they reason that failure to

5
6

7
8

9

committed on their territory or by their nationals; ibid, art 14. Yet the court may also
exercise jurisdiction over a signatory adversely by ﬁnding it unwilling or unable to
prosecute, and it may exercise jurisdiction over a non-signatory in a situation referred
by the Security Council.
Ibid, arts 6, 7, 8, 9.
David Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of
International Criminal Law’ in Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, eds, The Philosophy
of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 569 at 569–70 [Luban,
‘Fairness’].
Alejandro Chehtman, The Philosophical Foundations of Extraterritorial Punishment (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 87–139 [Chehtman, Philosophical].
See Fernando Teson, ‘The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’ in JL Holzgrefe & Robert O Keohane, eds, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political
Dilemmas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 93 [Teson]. Cf. Bruno
Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 EJIL 1 at 4
[Simma]; Antonio Cassese, ‘Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’
(1999) 10 EJIL 23 at 25–6 [Cassese].
Andrew Altman & Christopher Heath Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 69–95 [Altman & Wellman]. See also Anthony Sammons, ‘The “Under-Theorization” of Universal Jurisdiction: Implications
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protect a population from ordinary criminal violence sufﬁces to justify
the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction by other states.10
While this argument reduces the obstacle national sovereignty poses
to international prosecution, it also raises the bar for justifying the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by any authority. If government must earn
the power to punish by protecting rights effectively and uniformly, criminal jurisdiction would seem to require a reliable enforcement capacity
the international legal system lacks. This article will explore this problem
from three points of view.
First, it will develop a justiﬁcation for the power to proscribe and punish that depends on its regular and effective exercise and its popular
legitimacy. We will see that criminal law can plausibly be justiﬁed as a
cooperative institution that achieves the public good of a rule of law,
with its attendant beneﬁts of social peace and security of status. Criminal
law achieves authoritative resolution of disputes by mobilizing the community of those subject to its jurisdiction to accept its proscriptions and
participate in its judgments of blame. It motivates this participation by
promising to secure to each such person equal dignity as the bearer of
inviolable rights. Conceived as a cooperative institution for producing a
public good, criminal law is justiﬁable as beneﬁcial in reducing violence,
fair in repaying compliance with security and dignity, and legitimate in
winning the assent of those it governs. Yet criminal law’s efﬁcacy, fairness, and legitimacy depend on its effectiveness in preventing much
potential violence and punishing most actual violence. It follows that
criminal prohibitions may not be justiﬁable if they cannot be enforced
systematically.
Second, the article will assess Alejandro Chehtman’s ‘jurisdictional
theory of international crimes’11 in light of this proposition. Chehtman’s
defence of international criminal liability is particularly salient because
he agrees with criminal law theorists that the ‘scope of [the] . . . power
to punish is determined by the reasons that justify . . . holding the power
to punish.’12 Moreover, he agrees that punishment is justiﬁed by its contribution to a rule of law that provides effective protection. Thus, Chehtman justiﬁes criminal punishment as necessary to the public good of
for Legitimacy on Trials of War Criminals by National Courts’ (2003) 21 Berkeley J
Int’l L 111 at 114 [Sammons].
10 Altman & Wellman, ibid at 76–82. Their argument is consistent with the recently proposed doctrine of ‘responsibility to protect’; see Implementing the Responsibility to Protect:
Report of the Secretary-General, UNGAOR, 63d Sess, Agenda Items 44 and 107, UN Doc
A/63/677 (12 January 2009) at para 11(a); Catherine Powell, ‘Libya: A Multilateral
Constitutional Moment?’ (2012) 106 Am J Int’l L 298 [Powell].
11 Chehtman, Philosophical, supra note 7 at 87.
12 Ibid at 56.
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criminal law’s being ‘in force.’ This good secures the dignity of a population by vindicating their rights against violence. On this basis, Chehtman
objects to most extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction as practically
incapable of achieving this beneﬁt. Nevertheless, he defends extraterritorial jurisdiction to punish international crimes as the only means to
punish leaders and ofﬁcials pursuing inhumane policies. Yet we will ﬁnd
that it is very difﬁcult to reconcile international criminal liability with his
premises. It seems unlikely that these extremely rare prosecutions would
achieve the good of international criminal law’s being ‘in force’ or make
any tangible contribution to the security or dignity of the world’s population. His claim that the good of international criminal law’s being ‘in
force’ is achieved by any punishment, however infrequent and ineffectual, contradicts his approach to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of states.
Applying his normative premises consistently, however, we will ﬁnd international criminal punishment justiﬁed only in the rare circumstance
that foreign forces have already intervened effectively in defence of
human rights.
Third, the article will consider an alternative response to the critique
that the international law of crimes is practically unenforceable. Perhaps
the deﬁciencies of international criminal liability as a rule of law balance
each other out: its expected ineffectuality arguably renders its expected
illegitimacy acceptable and vice versa. David Luban argues that the conventional liberal challenge to criminal punishment is less applicable to
international tribunals for this reason.13 According to Luban, ordinary
criminal punishment must be justiﬁed because the power to proscribe
and punish can give rise to a comprehensive power to govern. Yet, since
an international tribunal cannot parlay its very limited criminal jurisdiction into such a power, it needs less justiﬁcation. Whatever inﬂuence the
International Criminal Court exercises, Luban argues, will be expressive,
as it dramatizes the wrongdoing of a few selected offenders in spectacular trials.14 By such means, international criminal law, he argues, will
‘build its legitimacy from the bottom,’15 persuading the global public to
support its norms. The difﬁculty with this expressive justiﬁcation for
exemplary trials is that criminal punishment does not only express a
message about the wrongdoer. It also expresses a message about the
punishing authority: that it enforces a legal order committed to preventing or punishing all similar offences and vindicating the dignity of all
such victims. Thus, criminal punishment confers credit as well as blame.

13 Luban, ‘Fairness,’ supra note 6 at 581–4.
14 Ibid at 574–6.
15 Ibid at 588.
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If international legal institutions lack the capacity and commitment to
suppress international offences, however, that credit is undeserved.

II
A

The normative basis of criminal jurisdiction

PUNISHMENT AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION

Criminal punishment is a collaborative institutional practice of applying
criminal laws. To justify punishment is, therefore, to explain the political
legitimacy of an institution, not the moral permissibility of an act. As I
have argued in previous work, familiar accounts of punishment as utilitarian and retributive are more persuasive and more compatible with one
another when punishment is conceptualized as an institutional practice.
Retributivists commonly argue that an individual ethical duty to maximize utility could as easily justify framing and afﬂicting the innocent as
punishing the guilty.16 Yet this argument is misapplied against utilitarian
theories of punishment like Bentham’s which justify punishment as the
outcome of a transparently utilitarian policy process. It invokes hypotheticals in which well-meaning ofﬁcials make the public believe that the
guilty are being punished in order to achieve deterrence.17 Yet it would
not maximize utility to empower ofﬁcials to deceive the public in this
way because public ofﬁcials are governed by the same selﬁsh motives as
potential offenders and will serve the public welfare only in so far as they
are properly incentivized and monitored.18 A publicly announced policy
of permitting ofﬁcials to deceive the public would sow insecurity and
conﬂict, while a secret policy would violate the preconditions for the pursuit of utility and would be precluded in a properly designed utilitarian
state. Stripped to its essentials, the retributivist argument is this:
Premise 1: utilitarianism is the moral view that we should each serve only
the value of utility.
Premise 2: honesty and legality are rival values, external to utility.
Conclusion: therefore utility demands that public ofﬁcials lie and break
the law.
16 EF Carritt, Ethical and Political Thinking (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947) at 65. See
also HJ McCloskey, ‘An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism’ (1957) 66 Philosophical Review 466 at 468–9 for similar examples.
17 Robert Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1995) at 70; John Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ in Gertrude Ezorsky, ed, Philosophical Perspectives on Punishment (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1973) 82 at 87.
18 See generally, Guyora Binder & Nicholas Smith, ‘Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent’ (2000) 32 Rutgers LJ 115, explaining and supporting an institutionalist interpretation of Bentham and other utilitarian thinkers.
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Yet premise 1 mischaracterizes utilitarianism. Utilitarianism addresses
society as a whole rather than individual actors. It recommends that society organize itself politically so as to be able to achieve public utility by
generating and implementing policy that can be seen to serve public welfare when tested in open debate before a democratic public. This, in turn,
requires that democratic citizens be able to monitor and supervise ofﬁcials. These process requirements for the pursuit of public utility impose
obligations on ofﬁcials of honesty and ﬁdelity to law. Thus, premise 2 is
also false. As necessary procedural conditions for the identiﬁcation of public utility, honesty and legality are constitutive of that value. In short, critics
of the utilitarian theory of punishment generate a pseudo-problem by mischaracterizing it as a theory about how punishment is morally justiﬁed
rather than a theory about how to make it politically legitimate.
We can generate a parallel pseudo-problem for retributivism by identifying it with a character like Detective Hank Quinlan in Touch of Evil,
who achieves desert by planting evidence to frame the guilty, or a Magnum Force that conducts extrajudicial executions.19 Does not retributivism compel individuals to inﬂict deserved punishment irrespective of
whether it is authorized by law? The parallel implied argument is
Premise 1: retributivism imposes a moral obligation to render desert
without compromise.
Premise 2: honesty and legality are rival values, external to retribution.
Conclusion: therefore, public ofﬁcials are sometimes bound to deceive
the public or break the law to achieve desert.
This argument is also ﬂawed because it ignores the political structure of
retributive punishment as a cooperative enterprise that imposes rolebound obligations. In retributivism, the duty is not to harm or wreak
revenge upon moral wrongdoers but to punish legal wrongdoers according
to law. The primary point of retributive punishment is to impose authoritative denunciation of wrongdoing and recognition of the equal dignity of
victims and offenders as subjects of legal rights. Such authoritative denunciation and recognition are necessarily collaborative enterprises because
authority is a social construct. Individuals fulﬁl their duties of contributing
to retributive punishment, not by inﬂicting suffering, but by collectively
supporting the authority of law to impose blame and suffering. In Kant’s
retributive theory, retributive justice cannot be achieved by an individual
19 Touch of Evil, 1958, DVD (Universal City, CA: Universal International, 2000); Magnum
Force, 1973, DVD (Burbank, CA: Warner Bros Pictures, 2001). A more sympathetic
example is Detective McNulty, who facilitates perjured testimony to frame a brutal
murderer for a different killing; ‘All Prologue,’ DVD: The Wire, Season 2, episode 6
(New York, NY: HBO, 2008).
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because it requires an effectual legal system that confers and protects
rights. Moreover, justice requires that law be collectively self-imposed by
those subject to it through participation in a democratic process of collective law making. Thus, the value of retributive justice requires that punishment be regular, effectual, public, and democratically legitimate.20
Thus, the utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment are not best
considered moral defences of punishment. They are political theories, deﬁning conditions for the legitimacy of coercive enforcement. Punishment
cannot be justiﬁed by the desert of a particular perpetrator or the utility
of punishing him. Instead, we must show why it is fair or efﬁcacious to task
a particular institution with imposing punishment. In short, justifying punishment is always a problem of justifying the jurisdiction of a particular
punishing authority. If so, the propriety of punishing a tyrant does not just
depend on whether he deserves it or whether it is expedient. It also depends on whether there is an institution competent to punish him.
B

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND THE RULE OF LAW

Modern legal theorists generally view law as a system of social control
characterized by formal authority and involving acceptance of directives
merely because of the process by which they are issued. Although legal
directives are often enforced by coercive sanctions, some inﬂuential
legal theorists deny that this is a necessary feature of legal systems.21
A ‘rule of law’ is a different matter: it arguably must have teeth. A ‘rule
of law’ connotes that law is ‘regular’ in its requirements and that it
‘rules’ – that law is applied and enforced.22 In his inﬂuential list of the
procedural requirements of legality in ‘The Morality of Law,’ Lon Fuller
includes ‘generality,’ ‘clarity,’ ‘prospectivity,’ and ‘constancy,’ which
roughly comprise a requirement of regularity. Fuller also includes ‘congruence,’ which means that law must actually be applied.23 The requirement that law rule is often contrasted with the rule of man. Albert
Dicey’s inﬂuential formulation of the rule of law includes the idea of
equality before the law,24 which implies universal subjection to and
20 Guyora Binder, ‘Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?’ (2002) 5 Buff Crim L Rev
321 at 350–66.
21 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 27–40; Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 157.
22 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Concept and Rule of Law’ (2008) 43 Ga L Rev 1 at 14–28.
23 Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1969) at 33–94; David Luban, ‘The Rule of Law and Human Dignity: Re-examining
Fuller’s Canons’ (2010) 2 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 29 at 30–1.
24 Albert Venn Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 5th ed (New
York: Macmillan, 1897) at 185–7 (rule of law as equality before law). See also, David
Dyzenhaus, ‘Judicial Independence, Transitional Justice, and the Rule of Law’(2003)
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protection by law and precludes the direct rule of one person over
another. To prevent such personal subordination, law must exhaustively
regulate violence. This is the chief purpose of criminal law.
Criminal law is distinctive in that a public authority – paradigmatically
the state – forbids conduct and imposes punishment for committing it.
Criminal law is integral to a rule of law that suppresses vengeance and
gives the state a ‘monopoly on legitimate force.’25 Whatever the other
purposes of criminal law, it asserts public control over the use of violence. Drawing on both utilitarian and retributivist sources, the remainder of this section develops the concept of criminal law as a system of
public proscription and punishment that regulates violence.
1 Prohibition
Criminal law is distinctive in proscribing conduct. Law sometimes attaches burdensome legal consequences to conduct without evaluating it.
Thus, expectation damages in contract merely internalize the promisee’s
costs in the promissor’s decision whether to perform while permitting –
even encouraging – efﬁcient breach. By contrast, criminal law does not
merely attach a consequence to offences. In punishing offenders, it denounces them personally and forces them to suffer deprivation or injury,
with no direct beneﬁt to anyone else. Moreover, criminal law authorizes
the use of coercive force, sometimes deadly force, to prevent offences.
Thus, criminal law disapproves offences ex post and forbids them ex ante.
Criminal guilt therefore implies not only wrongdoing but also deﬁance
of the law.26 Criminal punishment responds by reasserting the authority
of law.27 It presupposes a prior exercise by someone of legislative jurisdiction to proscribe, conferring on someone executive jurisdiction to
prevent.
In the terminology developed by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, expectation damages and compensatory damages are liability
rules, whereas a rule that forbids injury is either a property rule or an
inalienability rule.28 A liability rule imposes a duty to compensate for

25

26
27
28

10 Otago L Rev 345 at 358–9, stating that the requirement of civic equality is implied
by the practice of reason giving, which is in turn implicit in Fuller’s requirement that
law be intelligible.
Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in Hans Heinrich Gerth & Charles Wright Mills,
eds, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated by Hans Heinrich Gerth & Charles
Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958) at 77.
Jean Hampton, The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy, ed by Daniel Farnham (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 79–94.
Ibid at 108–50.
Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089 at 1107.
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injury but does not forbid injury. Criminal protections of consent such
as prohibitions against theft and sexual assault may be seen as property
rules. Criminal injuries which the victim may not authorize by consent
such as child rape and homicide may be seen as violating inalienability
rules.
Why should some conduct be forbidden rather than just priced or discouraged?
Calabresi and Melamed argue that transfers are likely to be more economically ‘efﬁcient’ if they are consensual. They reason that intentional
injuries should be forbidden by a property rule because it should be possible to bargain with a known victim and ﬁnd out how much compensation that victim will demand before consenting to a speciﬁc injury. By
contrast, the endangerment of many should merely be discouraged by a
liability rule because it would be too costly for the risk imposer to bargain with all potential victims in advance.29
Yet there are also dignitary costs to a liability rule when the victim is
known and the injury is intentional. Ignoring the owner’s will is an insult,
implying the owner counts for less than the offender. To say that a
known victim can be bargained with at low cost is to say that the offender
and victim are already in a communicative relationship such that injury
without prior communication is nevertheless expressive, conveying a
message of disrespect. Intentional injury of a known victim is personal
and is understood as such.
Not all criminal offences violate individual entitlements. Some violate
duties to cooperate in the production of public goods. It is often said
that coercion is required to motivate cooperation because government
cannot easily bargain with individual defectors by, for example, withholding the beneﬁts of public goods like national defence, clean air, or
safe trafﬁc conditions. Proscribing and punishing morally ambiguous
regulatory offences associates them with violent crimes against persons.
Criminal law thereby mobilizes our gratitude for the state’s protection
against violence and uses it to motivate compliance with other cooperative institutions. Thus, the legitimacy of criminal enforcement of civic
duties like taxation rests, in large part, on the criminal law’s success in
protecting individuals from violence.
2 Punishment
Criminal law is distinctive not only in proscribing but also in imposing
punishment. We can deﬁne punishment as afﬂiction imposed by an institution because of blame for committing forbidden conduct. Punishment

29 Ibid at 1108–9.
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is a practice of coercion, afﬂicting the offender regardless of his or her
wishes. Punishment is unusual as a legal remedy because it inﬂicts injury
purposefully, not just as a predictable by-product of some other aim.
Because punishment afﬂicts on the basis of blame, it is not only a coercive but also an expressive practice. Punishment denounces an offender
as responsible for a forbidden act. By thus denouncing the offender,
punishment implicitly justiﬁes the coercion it imposes as deserved for
wrongdoing.
In expressing blame for a previously forbidden act, punishment also
implies a certain relationship between the offender and a punishing
institution. The offender is to blame not just for a wrong but also for disobedience. Thus, along with blame, punishment expresses a claim to
authority, the authority to direct behaviour. Even punishment of children
within a family has this structure. In punishing, the parent claims legitimate authority as a decision maker for the family and implies that the
child has violated a justly imposed duty. Thus, to punish is to act in role,
as an agent of an institution that also imposes obligations on the person
punished. The wrong it denounces is not just an injury to an individual
but is also an injury to an institutional interest. In responding to the violation of a norm, punishment treats the person punished as also an
agent with institutional responsibilities. Thus, it implies a shared enterprise, uniting those subject to the authority of the punishing power in a
moral community.
The idea of punishment as an institutionally authorized enforcement
of a norm helps us to distinguish punishment from revenge. Revenge
lacks the claim to represent an institution toward which both punisher
and punished owe a duty of obedience. Revenge can be taken against an
avowed enemy toward whom one recognizes no duties. It need not be
motivated by a claim of injustice. Yet revenge can also serve as a customary response to perceived wrongs. In a fragmented, stateless society,
revenge may be the only means of redressing a grievance between members of different social groups.
Yet revenge is provocative because, in many cultures, unreciprocated
force is the prerogative of superiors disciplining subordinates. Thus, violence is an implicit claim to governing authority that, until requited, subordinates the victim. In cultures governed by notions of martial honour,
accepting violence without resistance implies a cowardly acceptance of
subordinate status and invites further violence.30 Thus, victims face
30 For classic accounts of honour-based feuding, see Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Southern
Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983);
William Ian Miller, Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law and Society in Medieval Iceland (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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intense pressure to avenge injuries. Because revenge lacks the backing
of a higher authority, however, it is often experienced as a fresh wrong,
demeaning the original perpetrator, who is then honour-bound to continue the dispute by avenging this insult. This destructive dialectic of
responsive vengeance can continue indeﬁnitely.
Punishment is designed to end this dialectic by providing an authoritative determination of who is in the wrong. In so far as they accept the
punishment as authoritative, members of the society deny the signiﬁcance of the injury as an exercise of governing authority over the victim.
This undoes the damage done the victim’s dignity and restores equality
of status between perpetrator and victim.31 If an important purpose of
punishment is to affect the social status of the victim, punishment must
engage the participation of society’s members in authoritative judgments
of blame. This authoritative denunciation of the offender’s wrongdoing
renders the injury to the offender retributive rather than retaliatory.
Unlike vengeance, punishment is authorized by an institution to
which the person punished owes allegiance. Punishment removes the
burden of pursuing vengeance from the victim and precludes the punished offender’s reasserting the justice of his initial offence by retaliating
against the victim. If the offender accepts the authority of the punishing
institution, he can only establish the justice of his position by addressing
arguments to that institution.
Adil Haque has proposed that international criminal tribunals can
help re-establish the rule of law after civil conﬂicts because opposing
sides can accept the punishing power as impartial.32 Yet, on our analysis,
the authority to punish requires more than the appearance of impartiality: it requires the allegiance of those subject to punishment. This condition may be difﬁcult for international institutions to meet.
3 Public authority
In criminal punishment, the punishing institution is a public authority
to which offender and victim both owe allegiance, typically the state.33 In
proscribing and punishing, this authority promises to suppress the cyclic
violence of vengeance by discouraging both provocative and retaliatory
violence through denunciation and coercion. The public authority also
obviates retaliatory violence by subordinating the offender to public

31 Hampton, supra note 27 at 108–50.
32 Adil Haque, ‘Group Violence and Group Vengeance: Toward a Retributivist Theory
of International Criminal Law’ (2005) 9 Buff Crim L Rev 273 [Haque].
33 See generally Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values
(New York: Routledge, 1988), treating justiﬁcation of criminal punishment as a problem of political obligation.
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authority and by recruiting the entire membership of society to
denounce the offence. The victim’s status is protected everywhere that
the public authority’s law is enforced. By delegating their power of
revenge to a state and accepting its exclusive authority to achieve retribution for offences of violence, private parties cooperate to achieve the
public good of a rule of law. Blood feuds are a classic collective action
problem, in which a pattern of individually rational conduct makes
everyone worse off. A rule of law solves this collective-action problem by
creating public capacity to resolve disputes.34
Criminal law transforms private injuries into public wrongs by proscribing and punishing them. By treating the victim’s injury as a matter
of public concern, criminal law clothes each member of society in an
equal status of civil dignity or ‘inviolability,’ in Frances Kamm’s terminology.35 This transformation of private into public wrongs makes an attack
on the rights of any member of society an attack on the dignity of all.
This dignity gives every member of society reason to identify with law
and that identiﬁcation can motivate compliance more effectively than
deterrent threats do.36
Just as loyalty to the rule of law helps make it effectual, effectiveness in
suppressing criminality and protecting rights is also important to fostering loyalty to the rule of law. A system of criminal justice that lacks the
capacity to protect rights regularly lacks credibility in denouncing rights
violations and restoring victims’ damaged dignity. Competing social
groups are likely to rely on militias and gangs for protection instead. The
result is likely to be the vicious cycle of the blood feud rather than the
virtuous cycle of the rule of law.
Criminal law, as we have described it, requires an institution with the
authority to proscribe and to blame and the power to coerce. By systematically preventing or punishing degrading violence, criminal law can
protect the equal dignity of those subject to its proscriptions. By delivering on this promise of equal dignity, a rule of law can motivate those

34 There is little evidence that marginally harsher sanctions improve deterrence in a society with a functioning criminal justice system; see Anthony N Doob & Cheryl Marie
Webster, ‘Sentence Severity and Crime’ (2003) 30 Crime and Justice 143 at 181–9.
However, the absence of such a system in collapsed states, for example, can lead to astronomically high levels of violence, with dire secondary effects on public health and
welfare; see Randolph Roth, American Homicide (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2009) at 9–10, 18–9. The effectiveness and credibility of a
rule of law are matters of degree, but there appears to be a ‘tipping point’ below
which isolated acts of punishment make little contribution to a rule of law.
35 Frances Kamm, ‘Inviolability’ (1995) 20 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 165.
36 Tom R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2006) at 178, 269–70.
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subject to its proscriptions to accept the duty to obey, to join in blaming
offenders, and to suffer punishment if they offend. General acceptance
of such duties of cooperation increases compliance and diminishes the
need for coercion. Thus, both welfarist and retributivist reasoning converge to justify proscription and punishment that promote the public
good of a rule of law. Yet a rule of law makes a promise to protect equal
dignity. A legal system ‘unwilling or unable’ to keep that promise arguably has no business exercising criminal jurisdiction.
III
A

A jurisdictional critique of international criminal liability

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY

The rule-of-law defence of punishment offered in Part II implies that justiﬁed exercise of legislative jurisdiction to proscribe and judicial jurisdiction to impose punishment also require the capacity to exercise
executive jurisdiction. This part applies that principle in assessing international criminal jurisdiction.
International lawyers usually identify ﬁve bases for the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction. The most commonly invoked is territorial jurisdiction, jurisdiction over criminal acts taking place or having effects in locations where the punishing authority has exclusive effective control.
Territorially based legislative and judicial jurisdiction presuppose executive enforcement capacity because the very concept of territory entails
this. It may be, as Mireille Hildebrandt’s contribution to this workshop
attests, that digital technology has outmoded the concept of territory.37
Perhaps exclusive control over conduct in one place is no longer possible – if it ever was – without exclusive control everywhere. Nevertheless,
the concept of territory presupposes at least a claim to executive jurisdiction and an aspiration to effective control.
Other bases of jurisdiction include ‘active personality,’ the jurisdiction
of a state over the conduct of its nationals wherever committed, and ‘passive personality,’ the jurisdiction of a state over conduct injuring its nationals, wherever located. Perhaps active personality jurisdiction also
presupposes a measure of enforcement power, since citizens have entitlements vulnerable to forfeiture, even when they are abroad. ‘Protective
jurisdiction’ extends to conduct anywhere that injures government interests, such as the authenticity of its currency or the secrecy of its military
plans. Universal jurisdiction extends to internationally proscribed conduct committed anywhere, perhaps in order to protect such international interests as ‘humanity,’ ‘peace,’ or ‘freedom of navigation.’
37 Mireille Hildebrandt (2013) 63 UTLJ 198 at 203 [present issue].
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In his subtly reasoned book on extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction,
Chehtman sets out to identify the principles that can best justify the
international law of criminal jurisdiction as it stands, but also to propose
reforming legal doctrines that cannot be thus justiﬁed. He takes as given
that the world ‘is divided into’ self-governing territorial states, and ‘the
existence of international criminal tribunals.’38 Yet there is an obvious
asymmetry between these two premises: territorial states are vastly more
consequential institutions than international criminal tribunals are. The
jurisdictional principles Chehtman develops to accommodate the importance of territorial states are quite persuasive. However, they prove
incommodious for the international criminal tribunals he is also committed to justifying.
Rather than basing his conclusions on the sovereign equality of states,
Chehtman derives the scope of criminal jurisdiction from principles justifying the power to punish. He explains criminal punishment on a basis
similar to our rule of law rationale: punishment is justiﬁed in so far as it
contributes to the public good of criminal proscriptions’ being ‘in force’
and thereby secures the dignity of a population as persons with legally
protected rights. The central insight of his book is that extraterritorial
jurisdiction is presumptively illegitimate because law cannot, as a practical matter, be ‘in force’ where the legislating authority lacks executive
power to enforce it. Where law cannot be in force, it cannot secure the
dignity of those it claims to govern. Unable to achieve their justifying
beneﬁt, extraterritorial proscription and punishment are presumptively
illegitimate. On this basis, he rejects most extraterritorial applications of
national criminal law, especially those based on the nationality of perpetrators and victims.
Nevertheless, Chehtman endorses universal jurisdiction to impose
international criminal liability. He argues that a belligerent state cannot
be trusted to protect enemy soldiers and civilians in war time against war
crimes by its soldiers. The criminal jurisdiction of the enemy state is also
insufﬁcient, he argues, because, while it has the motivation to punish, it
lacks the capacity. Security against impunity for war crimes, therefore, requires extraterritorial punishment by third states or international tribunals with both the motivation and capacity to punish. Similarly, he
argues, the territorial state cannot provide the requisite security to its
own population against grave human rights abuses by its ofﬁcials. Securing that population’s dignity also requires extraterritorial application of
international criminal law by third states or international tribunals with
the motivation and capacity to punish.

38 Chehtman, Philosophical, supra note 7 at 2–3.
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These conclusions seem contradictory. Chehtman does not explain
why potential victims should think that extraterritorial powers have any
greater capacity to enforce international criminal law than they have to
enforce national law. He ﬁnds it impossible for anyone to believe that
the law of one sovereign state can protect her on the territory of a second sovereign state – but not impossible to believe that international law
protects her there.
Yet, since international law recognizes active and passive personality
jurisdiction, sovereignty is not necessarily coextensive with territory, and
there is no logical barrier to the criminal law of one state applying in the
territory of another state. Thus, we should understand Chehtman’s
claim that extraterritorial national law lacks credibility as a claim about
popular consciousness rather than logic. He seems to assume that territorial jurisdiction best promotes feelings of security and dignity because
ordinary people associate the force of law with territorial control. But if
so, it seems unlikely that ordinary people think that international criminal law is ‘in force’ within their own countries, protecting their dignity.
In short, Chehtman does not convincingly exclude international criminal liability from his critique of extraterritorial criminal liability as incapable of producing the beneﬁts of law ‘in force.’
B

LAW ‘IN FORCE’

Chehtman grounds the right to punish in its service to the ‘public good’
of a system of criminal law ‘in force.’ He reasons that a system of criminal
law requires proscriptive rules, with punishment of violators authorized
by the proscribing authority. He adds that applying such a system against
crimes of violence protects the security of persons and their dignity as
persons with legally protected rights.
Although Chehtman’s concept of ‘law in force’ closely resembles the
concept of ‘rule of law’ developed here, his account of this public good
differs in an important respect. The present discussion concluded that a
system of criminal punishment that achieves popular legitimacy tangibly
improves well-being by motivating compliance, obviating vengeance, and
enabling cooperation to repair the social status of crime victims. However, Chehtman equivocates as to how integral these consequences are
to the good of a system of criminal law’s being in force. To be sure, in arguing that law’s being ‘in force’ justiﬁes punishment, he emphasizes its
beneﬁts:
The beneﬁt that a system of criminal laws being in force provides to individuals
in a given state is hardly trivial . . . In a society which only allows for private selfdefense and retaliation as responses to wrongdoing the situation would quickly
deteriorate and individuals would end up living in constant fear, as living
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conditions in failed states tend to illustrate . . . Punishment . . . conveys the message that the protection of law is real.
Furthermore . . . when the criminal law operates in the way advocated here . . .
it contributes to . . . a kind of order based on the moral signiﬁcance of . . .
rights. . . . [T]his sense of dignity and security is arguably an essential component of our well-being.39

Yet, despite the ‘enormous’ beneﬁts he claims for punishment in suppressing violence, obviating vengeance, and banishing fear, Chehtman
insists that ‘none of these beneﬁcial aspects of the institution of legal
punishment are necessary to justify’ it.40
Yet, if ‘law in force’ does not prevent or vindicate many violations of
legal rights, how does it secure dignity? Chehtman’s idea is that each act
of punishment confers dignity on all holders of the right vindicated, by
deﬁnition, because it attributes to them the status of persons protected by
general laws. On this view, even isolated instances of punishment would
still honour all members of society by implying that they are protected,
even if this implication is patently false. If the claim of protection is not
credible, however, its expression cannot enhance subjective feelings of
security. Moreover, if the punishing authority cannot mobilize general
participation in blaming, punishment may not even repair the dignity of
the victim of the particular crime punished, let alone enhance the dignity
of anyone else. Both accounts of the public good produced by punishment emphasize its expressive implications. However, in our account, the
expressive implications of punishment matter because they have consequences for behaviour and for social status. Conceived as social status, dignity is not a hollow consolation but a good people care deeply about.
Chehtman defends his claim that the justifying beneﬁts of punishment
do not depend on its consequences by pointing out the ineffectuality of
punishing international crime in particular:
[O]ur interest in preventing crimes . . . is more clearly served by a liberty to stop
and harm [offenders] . . ., rather than by a power to punish them . . . NATO’s
military intervention against Serbia, for one, had a much stronger impact on
stopping crimes being perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia . . . than the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia . . . or
any other threat of extraterritorial punishment. Indeed, the massacres in Srebrenica occurred two years after the creation of the ICTY, and the atrocities in
Kosovo were perpetrated six years later.41

39 Ibid at 40–1.
40 Ibid at 42.
41 Ibid at 41.
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Chehtman adds that ‘deterrence is weak in such contexts due to . . . the
limitation of resources and limited number of prosecutions, [and] the
lack of political legitimacy of most extraterritorial courts from the point
of view of the targeted groups or individuals.’42 In ﬂaunting the deﬁciencies of international criminal courts, Chehtman assumes his conclusion.
He cites their ineffectuality as evidence that effectuality is not an essential beneﬁt of a system of criminal law in force, so as to later argue that
international criminal law need not be effectual to be in force.
C

CHEHTMAN’S DEFENCE OF TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

Chehtman argues that, since enforcement of a system of criminal law
throughout a territory would enhance the security and dignity of everyone in the territory, penal jurisdiction should extend to all offences committed within a territory, regardless of the nationality of the offenders or
the victims.43 But if criminal law is beneﬁcial, why conﬁne it to a territorial population?
Chehtman offers three reasons. First, he argues that the population of
the proscribing state has no very strong interest in the protection of persons in other states.44 Yet it is not obvious why individuals in an arbitrarily bounded space have a stronger interest in the welfare of others
within the boundary than outside it. Do residents of Fort Erie, Ontario
beneﬁt more from criminal law in distant Vancouver than in nearby Buffalo? His other two arguments are more substantial, however. Thus, he
argues that persons in the other state have an interest in self-government
which militates against a foreign government’s being able to apply its law
in their territory.45 Finally, he argues that neither population could have
a substantial interest in one state’s law protecting the population of
another state because such a law could not do so effectively.46
While an individual is abroad, the only system of criminal law that can meaningfully contribute to her (relative) sense of dignity and security is the criminal law
of the territorial state . . . Because of the features of this public good, it cannot
be enjoyed extraterritorially.47

Thus, national law cannot be ‘in force’ abroad for the simple reason that
national governments lack executive power there. Hence, the justifying
beneﬁts of criminal law depend on its enforceability.
42
43
44
45
46
47

Ibid at 45.
Ibid at 56–9.
Ibid at 58, 60–1.
Ibid at 59.
Ibid at 67–8.
Ibid at 68.
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In sum, Chehtman’s defence of territorially based criminal jurisdiction
identiﬁes three conditions for legitimate punishment: self-governance,
reciprocity, and effectuality. Thus, the law imposing liability on a population must have its consent; must aim to protect its members as subjects
of legal rights; and must have the capacity to do so. These three conditions deﬁne a political community whose members cooperate in respecting a scheme of legal rights from which all beneﬁt. Yet Chehtman
provides no moral reason why that community must be geographically
discrete.
Sometimes nearby violence threatens our sense of security and dignity
more than remote violence, but not always. Members of geographically
dispersed social groups can feel more affected by remote violence within
or against their own group than by nearby violence affecting some other
community. If neighbouring groups habitually engage in reciprocal violence, they have a common interest in the enforcement of law against
both groups. But if violence is insular, neighbouring groups may be
indifferent to one another’s rates of violence. On the other hand, if territory happens to be an efﬁcient basis on which to organize policing, we
might have a prudential reason to organize executive jurisdiction along
geographic lines. If legislative and judicial jurisdictions need to be coextensive with executive jurisdiction to justify punishment, we would then
have reason to deﬁne all three geographically.48
Because Chehtman prioritizes territory over nationality as a basis of
criminal jurisdiction, he concludes that crimes committed by and against
visitors should be punished by the territorial state. On the same premises, he rejects most extraterritorial applications of active and passive
personality jurisdiction.
Yet most of these conclusions can also be justiﬁed on the basis of the
political relationships involved, without giving any intrinsic signiﬁcance
to territory. Punishment can be justiﬁably imposed on nationals who
offend against visitors because those nationals are punished according to
laws that are effectively enforced, that protect them reciprocally, and to
which they have constructively assented. Punishment of locally offending
visitors also satisﬁes the requisites of reciprocity and effectiveness as long
as they are punished under laws which are generally enforced and which
protect them as well. If they have entered the jurisdiction voluntarily and

48 An example of such reasoning is the case of R v Hape, [2007] 2 SCR 292, 2007 SCC 26,
McLachlin J, holding the right against unreasonable searches and seizures in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom inapplicable abroad on the basis that Canada’s legislative jurisdiction could not extend beyond the limits of its executive jurisdiction. I make a narrower claim, however: that criminal legislative and adjudicative
jurisdiction should not extend beyond executive jurisdiction.
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the laws’ proscriptions, procedures, and penalties meet international
human rights standards, we may deem them to have assented to jurisdiction also.
Extraterritorial application of passive personality jurisdiction can be
rejected under these principles because foreigners offending against a
visitor on foreign territory are neither protected by the criminal law of
the visitor’s state nor consulted in its legislation, and they have done
nothing to signal their consent. Moreover, proscriptions directed at foreigners on foreign territory are not likely to be enforced systematically
and so lack the effectiveness required for a rule of law.
Active personality jurisdiction is somewhat more justiﬁable. Even
though the offender’s state lacks executive jurisdiction abroad, offending nationals are likely to return home eventually. If extended by democratic legislation to nationals protected from similar offences at home,
active personality jurisdiction seems compatible with the dignity and selfgovernance of those punished. A polity might criminalize offences committed by its nationals abroad that also violate the law of the territorial
state, in the interest of good relations. Such punishment might enhance
protection of nationals from crime if done pursuant to an international
agreement committing other states to reciprocate. Of course, the justice
of extraterritorial punishment of nationals abroad depends on the justice of punishing the same conduct committed at home.
What about an offence committed between two nationals abroad? If
active personality jurisdiction is permitted, such an offence would be
punishable, which seems like the right result. Indeed, Chehtman approves jurisdiction where one national lures another over the border
into another country in order to commit a crime with impunity. Yet he
offers the peculiar rationale that this result is required by the territorial
principle49 – presumably, required to prevent the territorial principle
from having implausible implications! The more straightforward explanation for why the interaction between compatriots abroad should be
subject to their country’s law is that such law deﬁnes their mutual obligations as members of a political community.
Surprisingly, Chehtman approves extraterritorial application of protective jurisdiction. He supports punishing foreign ofﬁcials for espionage
against our government on their own soil, arguing this would advance the
common interests of ‘individuals in’ our country (even if they are foreign
nationals?).50 Yet such a proscription would be undemocratic, non-reciprocal, and ineffectual, failing all three of our jurisdictional principles.

49 Chehtman, Philosophical, supra note 7 at 66.
50 Ibid at 72.
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D CHEHTMAN’S ‘JURISDICTIONAL’ DEFENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Chehtman offers a ‘jurisdictional’ justiﬁcation for international criminal
liability for two types of crimes: war crimes and human rights abuses
committed by governments against their own populations. He argues
that offences are justiﬁably proscribed and punished by an extraterritorial authority when very grave offences are committed pursuant to government policy.51 He reasons that the government of the territorial state
cannot credibly proscribe its own wrongs. He adds that, while international proscription of ofﬁcial wrongs comes at some cost in self-government, this is outweighed by the beneﬁts to security and dignity of there
being a law ‘in force’ against governmental abuses. He then proceeds to
argue, on a similar basis, that all states should have universal judicial
jurisdiction to punish such international crimes:
[T]he collective interest . . . in a rule being in force against [international
crimes] . . . warrants conferring upon every state the power to punish those who
violate that rule. This is required, at least, if these criminal rules are to provide
any meaningful sense of dignity and security to them. In the absence of a centralized mechanism of distribution of criminal competence for international
crimes, universal jurisdiction provides us with the closest we can get to these
rules having any real sense of bindingness.52

Having endorsed universal jurisdiction to punish international crimes in
order to maximize enforcement, Chehtman reasons that it may be exercised by international tribunals like the ICC as well as by states.
This argument is vulnerable to two objections. First, it ignores the ability of national legal systems to credibly restrain ofﬁcial abuse through
constitutional norms and structures. To the extent that anyone feels
secure in her dignity as a subject of rights, it is likely because of national
law, not international law. Second, it overestimates the contribution the
possibility of international criminal punishment could make to such feelings of security. Extraterritorial states and tribunals are unlikely to
enforce international laws against government abuse for the same reason they are unlikely to enforce any other laws within a territorial state:
because they lack executive authority there.
On the other hand, we can justify foreign punishment of government
atrocity on the basis of Chehtman’s normative premises in the unusual
circumstances when foreign forces justiﬁably exercise executive authority. Recall that Altman and Wellman argue that a government that attacks its own people loses any claim to represent them or to exclude
51 Ibid at 101–3, 109.
52 Ibid at 121.
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other states from fulﬁlling the basic responsibilities of government in
their stead.53 Chehtman agrees that any government is justiﬁed in intervening militarily to resist and prevent ongoing atrocities.54 While the customary legality of humanitarian intervention remains controversial,55
even sceptics now accord the Security Council the power to declare a
humanitarian crisis a threat to peace and security and to organize or
authorize a military intervention.56 Security Council Resolution 1973,
authorizing such intervention in Libya and invoking the Libyan government’s ‘responsibility to protect,’ illustrates this power.57 In any case,
Chehtman appears to have no objection to extraterritorial executive jurisdiction to stop grave human rights abuses.
Once an intervening state has assumed executive power, there is no
longer any barrier to its achieving the public good of ‘law in force.’ Yet,
at that point, it no longer needs universal jurisdiction or any other form
of extraterritorial jurisdiction to punish crime because, as occupier, it
has succeeded to the powers and responsibilities of the territorial power.
It can punish international crimes on the same jurisdictional basis that
authorizes it to punish national crimes.58 So justifying jurisdiction to
punish international crime is simple, but not necessarily easy. All a state
need do to earn the legal right to punish atrocity is intervene to put an
end to it.
Yet this does not resolve the question of whether these atrocities are
properly punished as offences against international law. In many cases,
international criminal liability will be unnecessary because the atrocious
conduct will have been illegal under national law. States may have incorporated international humanitarian law into their military codes, applying it to captured enemy soldiers as well as their own. Yet even if they
have not, these international humanitarian law standards may still be
applicable as domestic common law. All belligerents immunize their
53 Altman & Wellman, supra note 9 at 76–82. For similar arguments, see Powell, supra
note 10; Anthony Sammons, supra note 9; Teson, supra note 8.
54 Chehtman, Philosophical, supra note 7 at 110–3.
55 See e.g. Simma, supra note 8 at 2–4; Cassese, supra note 8 at 24–5; Michael Byers &
Simon Chesterman, ‘Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral Intervention and
the Future of International Law’ in JL Holzgrefe & Robert O Keohane, eds, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 177; Jose Alvarez, ‘The Schizophrenias of R2P’ in Philip Alston &
Euan MacDonald, eds, Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008) vol 10, bk 2 at 275.
56 Cassese, supra note 8 at 2–4; Simma, supra note 8 at 25.
57 SC Res 1973, UNSCOR,66th sess, 6498th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011).
58 For an argument that the humanitarian occupier is bound to realize international
human rights norms, even at the cost of altering local law, see Gregory H Fox, Humanitarian Occupation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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soldiers from criminal liability both at home and abroad for lawful combat and must draw those standards of lawfulness from some source.
Whether or not they speciﬁcally proscribe crimes against humanity
and genocide in their national criminal law, all states criminalize such
abuses by proscribing ordinary offences of violence like murder, sexual
assault, kidnapping, and torture. Thus, we can redescribe the problem
of international criminal liability as a court of occupation’s choice as to
whether to recognize a government policy of atrocity as providing a justiﬁcation defence to the ofﬁcials who carried it out. We can think of international criminal law as merely precluding courts of occupation
(including international courts) from enforcing local laws that violate
international humanitarian or human rights standards. On this theory,
tyrants could be punished as common criminals under local law.59 An
advantage of this approach is that liability under national criminal law
presumptively meets the reciprocity and self-governance conditions for
legitimate proscription.
In sum, Chehtman’s premises imply that states may legitimately exercise or delegate to an international tribunal jurisdiction to punish foreign government ofﬁcials for mass murder if they intervene militarily in
defence of the victims. Having done so, their jurisdiction would no
longer be extraterritorial. Because occupiers exercise executive jurisdiction, they can realize the public good of law in force. Because extraterritorial states otherwise lack such enforcement capacity, however, their
occasional exercise of judicial jurisdiction to punish the isolated offenders who blunder into their territory would not serve what Chehtman regards as the justifying purpose of punishment. Such punishment cannot
meet the test of effectuality.

IV
A

The expressive signiﬁcance of prosecuting international crimes

PROSECUTION AS VINDICATION OF LAW

From the standpoint of liberal political theory, criminal punishment is ‘a
form of state violence’60 in need of justiﬁcation. Criminal punishment
coerces, inﬂicts injury, and violates liberal neutrality by imposing ofﬁcial
value judgments.61 If these transgressions of freedom are justiﬁed only

59 A possible obstacle to such prosecutions would be statutes of limitation in some jurisdictions.
60 Luban, ‘Fairness,’ supra note 6 at 575.
61 See Guyora Binder, ‘The Culpability of Felony Murder’ (2007–8) 83 Notre Dame L
Rev 965, 970–1, 1052–9 (tension between retributive punishment and liberal ideal of
value neutrality).
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in order to achieve the public good of a rule of law, justiﬁed punishment
must be systematic. This requires both executive power and judicial
capacity. These requisites are lacking when state and international tribunals exercise extraterritorial adjudicative jurisdiction to try international
crimes.
While extraterritorial states have little reason to respect the sovereignty of territorial states that attack their own populations, a right of
military intervention does not equal a justiﬁcation for punishment, unless
exercised. Upon exercising such a right, the intervening state is no longer
extraterritorial. Absent such intervention, however, a state has no more
capacity to enforce international criminal law abroad than it has to
enforce its own criminal law abroad.
International institutions also lack the enforcement capacity to prevent or systematically punish international crimes. The Security Council
is a cumbersome, veto-bound executive body. Its jurisdiction over internal conﬂicts is controversial because of their contingent relationship to
international peace and security. The Council’s jurisdiction is even less
well established over stable dictatorships successfully pursuing policies of
atrocious repression. There are also political barriers to Security Council
action, as illustrated by the recent resistance of permanent members
Russia and China to intervention in the Syrian revolution.
The institutional capacity of international courts is bound to be
extremely limited. Unless they are located in the affected territory and
attached to an occupation force with governing authority and capacity,
they have little access to witnesses or power to arrest defendants. Yet
international crimes are, by deﬁnition, systemic in their perpetration
and effects, involving large numbers of victims, participants, and witnesses who will likely fear both prosecution and retaliation from defendants and their supporters.62 Thus international criminal prosecution is
destined to be radically selective as to the situations it investigates and
the perpetrators it pursues. It cannot aspire to be even-handed in vindicating the equal dignity of victims. No population is likely to develop a
sense of security of status, trust in government, or conﬁdence in law
enforcement because of the few successes of international tribunals.
Yet, as David Luban argues, the fact that punishment of international
crime cannot be justiﬁed like state punishment – as necessary to vindicate a rule of law – does not preclude its being justiﬁed in some other
way. Luban argues that proscription and punishment of international
crimes need not meet as demanding a standard of legality, precisely

62 Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts 6–7 (deﬁnitions of genocide and crimes against
humanity).
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because the international legal system lacks executive power. It is in less
danger of using the power to punish to repress dissent or persecute enemies. If international criminal liability cannot achieve the beneﬁts of a
rule of law, neither can it achieve the harms of tyranny.63
Luban claims that punishment is not even really the point of international proscription of war crimes and domestic atrocities. Advocates of
international tribunals aim at trials rather than punishments.64 Such
trials are primarily expressive in function, a kind of ‘political theater.’65
According to Luban,
the most promising justiﬁcation for international tribunals is their role in norm
projection: trials are expressive acts broadcasting the news that mass atrocities
are, in fact, heinous crimes and not merely politics by other means. In recent
years, philosophers have studied expressive theories of punishment; the normprojection rationale adds an expressive theory of trials . . . The decision not to
stage criminal trials is no less an expressive act than the creation of tribunals; and
the expressive contents associated with impunity . . . are unacceptable . . . The
point of trials backed by punishment is to assert the realm of law against the
claims of politics.66

But is this ‘expressive’ justiﬁcation for international criminal liability
sufﬁciently distinct from Chehtman’s to escape its difﬁculties? To be
sure, Luban characterizes prosecution of international crimes as expressive rather than coercive in purpose, but can this expressive purpose be
achieved without effective enforcement capacity? He compares his
expressive account of trials to expressive accounts of punishment offered
by RA Duff and Jean Hampton.67 Yet, in these theories, punishment
does not merely ‘project norms’ by expressing that the crime was wrong.
In both theories, punishment expresses that the crime was wrong in disrespecting the victim’s dignity as an equal member of a community of
persons protected by legal rights and in ﬂouting the authority of that
community’s laws. The last sentence of Luban’s paragraph invokes the
‘realm of law’ and the need for punishment to vindicate it. It is not clear
63 Luban, ‘Fairness,’ supra note 6 at 584–6.
64 Ibid at 575. Elie Wiesel, for example, proposed that Eichmann be released rather than
punished after his trial; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’
(2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 1 at 3 [Koskenniemi]. See also
Ruti G Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 46–9, 66,
arguing that representative trials sufﬁce to fulﬁl the expressive aims of transitional
justice.
65 Luban, ‘Fairness,’ supra note 6 at 576.
66 Ibid at 576–7.
67 Luban, ‘Fairness,’ supra note 6 at 576, citing Jean Hampton & Jeffrie G Murphy, Forgiveness and Mercy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), and RA Duff, Trials
and Punishments (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986) at 235–62.
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that trials can express the message of legality Luban ascribes to them if
‘law’ is nothing more than the set for political theatre, a façade with no
ediﬁce behind it.
B

OTHER EXPRESSIVE FUNCTIONS

That trials for international crimes serve an expressive purpose does not
distinguish them from any other criminal trials because criminal punishment is ordinarily aimed at vindicating the law and the dignity of those it
protects. Nevertheless, let us consider what other expressive functions
might justify such trials. I will discuss ﬁve potential beneﬁts of trials for
international crimes: articulation of law, authorization of intervention,
legitimation of transitional justice, backstopping reconciliation, and
truth telling. Each of these functions, too, is likely to be undermined by
a lack of enforcement capacity.
1 Articulation of law
Although criminal punishment does not effectively enforce international
legal norms against atrocity, such law can nevertheless be enforced by
means of executive power. Trials can explain and justify such exercises
of power by reference to these legal norms. Thus, the Nuremberg prosecutions did not and, given their limited focus on leaders, could not fully
enforce international prohibitions on war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Nevertheless, these trials usefully articulated legal norms that
the Allies had already enforced, at great sacriﬁce, by defeating the Nazi
regime, destroying its machinery of death, and liberating its surviving victims. The trials explained the magnitude and importance of this achievement and could be invoked to justify further actions, such as the political
reconstruction of the defeated states, the integration of Europe, and the
creation of the United Nations and other international institutions.
Thus, by contrast with more recent international prosecutions, the
Nuremberg prosecutions had the merit of having gained authority from
and contributed authority to the largely just and efﬁcacious exercise of
executive power. The prosecuting powers earned a measure of moral
authority to punish Nazi atrocities because they did something about
them.68 In so doing, they asserted and exercised something like the governing authority of a sovereign state. International human rights seem a
lot more legally authoritative when they are backed by an army.
The optimism about international law that proliferated in the wake of
World War II arose in part from the success of the Allied war effort as an
68 To be sure, this authority was undermined by their own offences, largely left unpunished.
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experiment in transnational governance, mobilizing entire societies for
war, coordinating these efforts, and ultimately projecting this collaborative enterprise across the globe. The Security Council was an effort to perpetuate that alliance and its global leadership, while the United Nations
project of decolonization was an effort to perpetuate that alliance’s moral
authority as liberator. We are used to the idea that military mobilization
fosters nationalism, but in this case, it also fostered internationalism.
Thus, the Nuremberg trials began at the historic high water mark for
effective multilateral power, underwritten by the military hegemony of
the United States. Under these ﬂeeting circumstances, the trials’ message that the defeat of Germany represented the enforcement of law was
credible.
The difﬁculty with law articulation as a justiﬁcation for contemporary
international criminal prosecution is that the circumstances rendering
this message credible do not always obtain. Granted, the end of the Cold
War enabled the resumption of international institution building, some
experiments with internationally authorized intervention, the formation
of ad hoc and hybrid international criminal tribunals, and ultimately, the
formation of the International Criminal Court. Yet the performance of
the international community in humanitarian crises has been very different from its performance during World War II. Although NATO eventually intervened in Kosovo, there was no effective intervention in Croatia,
Bosnia, or Rwanda. In these settings, there was no international use of
force for trials to legitimate as law enforcement. Accordingly, when the
ad hoc tribunals for these conﬂicts ‘asserted the realm of law,’ the only
material embodiments of that law they could point to were the trials
themselves. This was law articulation without the corresponding reality
that justiﬁed it as truthful. It seems that articulation of law, like vindication of law, depends on the availability of executive power.
While punishment of international crime is less justiﬁable where nothing is done to prevent it, it does not follow that the international community is always obliged to prevent it. There are sometimes good reasons,
both prudential and moral, to eschew humanitarian intervention. Such
intervention can spread or prolong conﬂict and lead to foreign military
rule, bloody insurgency, or state collapse. All of these possibilities pose
their own humanitarian risks. Yet if we therefore decide it is not really
necessary to prevent atrocity, it cannot really be so important to punish
it either.
2 Authorizing intervention
Even if an international court cannot command an international police
force and impose an international rule of law, it might encourage compliance by persuasive means. Thus, even without a credible threat of
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military intervention, international legal institutions might promote
democratic transition in conjunction with international civil society. To
the extent that repressive governments persist because of the recognition and cooperation of other states, international support for democracy movements might tip the political balance toward change. The
success of such a movement in one country often emboldens such movements in neighbouring countries with similar societies and regimes. The
ICC’s indictment of Muammar Gaddaﬁ after the Libyan revolution had
begun provides an example of the Court’s supporting and seeing its
judgments ‘enforced’ by civil society.69
Yet there are reasons for caution. Criminal prosecution will typically
come too late in the process to help topple a dictator and the threat of it
may even impede a negotiated transition. Nor would we want the International Criminal Court to be driving such a process along. A policy of
deliberate destabilization and regime change is fraught with humanitarian risks. Revolutions can be bloody failures or lead to anarchy or civil
war. Not only is the ICC a foreign institution but, unlike a meddlesome
foreign government, it lacks the military capacity to come to the aid of
those it may have put at risk. So it should probably only play this role in
conﬂicts in which the Security Council has already intervened or authorized effective intervention. Such caution is reﬂected in the Rome Statute,
which limits the non-consensual jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to situations referred to it by the Security Council.70 Yet this ordering of the lines of authority between Security Council and
International Criminal Court largely precludes the Court from authorizing intervention and limits it to the law articulation function.
3 Legitimizing transitional justice
Another purpose of international criminal prosecution could be to help
secure a democratic transition by helping to build a rule-of-law culture
in the transitioning state. Recall Adil Haque’s suggestion that international courts can assist societies riven by bloody group conﬂict by providing an impartial forum for prosecuting atrocity. The international
community can determine fault and spare the new regime’s courts the
suspicions and resentments they would provoke by deciding such
cases.71 Yet the use of an international court for transitional justice also
poses dangers. First, it communicates that the municipal legal system
69 For a defence of the ICC indictment of Gaddaﬁ along these lines, see Mark Kersten,
‘The ICC in Libya: Beyond Peace vs Justice’ (May 10, 2012) online: Justice in Conﬂict
<http://justiceinconﬂict.org/2012/05/10/the-icc-in-libya-beyond-peace-vs-justice/>.
70 Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts 12, 13.
71 Haque, supra note 32 at 297.
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lacks impartiality and legitimacy. Second, the international tribunal may
be no better equipped than national tribunals to legitimize just verdicts
to the defeated community. Indeed, it may seek to dramatize its impartiality by prosecuting a few culprits from each side, even where there is a
vast disproportion between the wrongs committed by the two sides to a
conﬂict.
Once again, an international court’s very limited capacity prevents it
from enforcing law credibly. Of course, this may be precisely what is
intended in turning this job over to a foreign court of temporary jurisdiction with squeamish scruples about harsh punishment. The result may
be, not to legitimize transitional justice, but to outsource the impunity
required for a peaceful transition.
4 Backstopping reconciliation
A fourth approach would give international criminal trials a secondary
role in facilitating transitions to a rule of law regime. Suppose we think
the best path to establishing trust and legitimacy after an internal conﬂict is a non-punitive truth commission that incentivizes the culprits to
self-identify, admit wrongdoing, apologize, publicly acknowledge the dignity of their victims, and implicate their accomplices. As Luban admits,
‘truth and reconciliation commissions may do a better job’ of fulﬁlling
the expressive aims of ‘promoting social reconciliation, giving victims a
voice, and making a record.’72 Nevertheless, a truth commission arguably requires the stick of criminal prosecution to make the carrot of
immunity effective. Could the International Criminal Court support the
transition to a rule of law by backstopping a truth commission in this
way? Unfortunately, this function requires a prosecutor who can credibly
threaten to bring lots of prosecutions and a court with the capacity to try
them. Once again, the ICC’s limited investigative and adjudicative capacity makes it ill suited to this role.
5 Truth telling
This brings us to a ﬁfth possibility: that the function of international
criminal prosecution is not retribution, deterrence, or even the vindication of individual victims. Instead, it is simply truth telling, documenting
the wrongs committed and how they occurred.73 If so, again, a non-punitive truth commission may perform this function more comprehensively.
And comprehensiveness matters because the value of truth can be
72 Luban, ‘Fairness,’ supra note 6 at 576.
73 For discussion of the tensions between truth telling and assigning moral credit, see
Koskenniemi, supra note 64; Guyora Binder, ‘Representing Nazism: Advocacy and
Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie’ (1989) 98 Yale LJ 1321.
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violated by what is not said as well as by what is. Here, I worry that the
inherent selectivity and limited capacity of international criminal prosecution will obscure more than it reveals about what happened. Moreover,
assignment of the prosecutorial and judicial roles to representatives of
the international legal community itself communicates something that
may or may not be true.
One problem with selective punitive gestures deployed from a safe distance is that they violate what Ronald Dworkin regards as the distinctively legal virtue of ‘integrity.’74 Integrity is the principle that justice is
always comparative, requiring consistency of principle across cases and
even different areas of law. In this context, integrity militates against
punishing any act in isolation. All crime arises in a social context and all
criminal liability distorts and simpliﬁes that context in assigning blame
to individuals. As Mark Drumbl and Darryl Robinson have pointed out,
this is particularly true of human rights abuses, which are typically committed on a large scale by organizations and which have systemic
causes.75 On the other hand, criminal law gives decision makers considerable discretion in assigning individual responsibility for collective behaviour. Rules of vicarious liability can distribute blame quite broadly,
but they can be applied selectively. Thus, opportunistic punishment of a
few individuals can assign blame for collectively produced injury in misleading ways.
This problem is compounded by the fact that patterns of human rights
abuse often arise in societies essentially governed by criminal organizations. The traits of sociability, conformity, and submissiveness that discourage humans from offending in societies governed by a rule of just
law also encourage us to collaborate in societies run by thugs.76 If we
ﬂout social norms by offending in a society governed by a rule of just
law, we probably deserve to be blamed; but if we yield to social norms in
a society governed by tyranny and terror, our blame may be attenuated.
An instructive example here is the agonizing Erdemovic case, decided by
the ICTY, punishing a Croat recruited into a Bosnian Serb militia under
somewhat coercive circumstances and then forced at gunpoint to
74 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 9th ed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1986) at 95–6, 225.
75 Mark Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of
Mass Atrocity’ (2005) 99 Nw UL Rev 539; Haque, supra note 32 (roots of humanitarian crises in group conﬂict); Darryl Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International
Criminal Law’ (2008) 21 Leiden J Int’l L 925 at 926; see also Koskenniemi, supra note
64 at 13–6.
76 See generally Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York:
Harper & Row, 1974), explaining experimental demonstration of willingness to comply with authoritative directives to harm others.
(2013) 63 UTLJ © UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

DOI: 10.3138/utlj.1117-1

308 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL
massacre civilians.77 It appears that he later persuaded fellow soldiers to
disobey another mass execution order and was subsequently shot for it.78
Thus, had he been killed for futilely refusing the ﬁrst order, he arguably
would not have been in a position to save lives by resisting the second
order. This was one of the ICTY’s few prosecutions, made possible
because the traumatized offender turned himself in and sought punishment while more blameworthy offenders escaped liability.
While the absence of a rule of law may dilute the guilt of offenders, it
also reduces the standing to punish of legal authorities. If other states
could have saved victims and discouraged collaboration by intervening
against the tyrants and decided it was inexpedient to do so, they are in a
weak position to judge those who made an expedient choice to collaborate when they had no such opportunity to opt out. States that were part
of the web of circumstances that produced atrocity should not later help
themselves to an undeserved absolution by ﬁnding others to blame.
While the punishing authority expresses evaluations of offenders and
victims, it also expresses messages about itself in the very act of ascribing
its evaluations to the law. Joel Feinberg’s famous essay about the expressive functions of punishment actually says very little about blaming offenders or vindicating victims. Instead, it emphasizes claims about the law
itself. Feinberg discusses four expressive functions: authoritative disavowal, symbolic non-acquiescence, vindication of the law, and absolution of others. The ﬁrst three encompass claims that the law forbids the
offence, does not approve it, and is committed to suppressing offences
of its kind. The fourth implicit claim, absolution from blame of those
not punished, applies to government ofﬁcials as well as private citizens.79
An implicit message of all criminal liability is that injury to a legally protected interest was caused by individual culpability rather than social
conditions created or permitted by ofﬁcial policies.
These self-congratulatory messages are necessary to punishment’s beneﬁcial consequences. Only by expressing that the law disavows and condemns the offender’s act can the offender’s claim to dominion be
77 Rosa Brooks, ‘Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity & Duress’ (2003) 43 Va J Int’l L
861 at 863–6; Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, Appeal Judgment (7 October
1997) (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber),
online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org/case/erdemovic/4#acjug>.
78 Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemovic,, IT-96-22-A, Sentencing Judgment (29 November 1996)
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber) at para
81, online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj961129e.
pdf>.
79 Joel Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Functions of Punishment’ in Joel Feinberg, Doing and
Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1970) 95.
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refuted and the victim’s dignity restored. Only by showing its commitment to opposing such acts can the punishing authority reassure other
potential victims that it will prevent violence when it can and punish violence when it cannot. Finally, only by condemning the offence as proscribed by generally applicable law can the punishing authority present
the punishment as impartial retribution rather than partisan revenge.
Thus, any imposition of punishment as required by law implies a broader
commitment to enforce a rule of law systematically. It seems the truth
telling function of the criminal trial is not so easily separated from its law
vindication function because punishment implies a claim to vindicate
law. If a tribunal makes such a claim insincerely, it serves neither legality
nor truth.

V

Conclusion

Justiﬁed criminal punishment is punishment according to law. It requires
not only desert but the justiﬁed exercise of legislative and adjudicative
jurisdiction by some institution. Such jurisdictional authority depends on
protecting potential victims and offenders in their dignity as subjects of
legal rights. Protecting this dignity requires consistent defence and vindication of such rights. Thus, justiﬁed adjudicative criminal jurisdiction
also depends on the power to make law effective, which is to say the exercise of executive criminal jurisdiction.
The international community of states has now established an international court to occasionally punish grave human rights violations. Yet that
community – perhaps for good reasons – has not committed itself to
defend and vindicate international human rights with any regularity. Realizing human rights worldwide requires much more than denouncing a
few exemplary perpetrators. It entails the strenuous and morally compromised task of fostering rule-of-law states. Theatrical criminal trials blame
perpetrators for human rights violations, but they also absolve the international community that proscribes, prosecutes, judges, and punishes. It
is not obvious that this symbolic transaction is a net gain.
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